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A B S T R A C T
The colonization of adjacent professional fields has been considered as crucial to understand the
success and influence of large accounting firms, such as the Big 4. Yet, given the complexities of
managing different professional groups, remarkably little is known about the internal dynamics be-
hind large multidisciplinary accounting firms’ external responses to institutional pressures. In this ar-
ticle, we show how exogenous coercive pressure, such as regulation (in this case Dutch accountancy
regulations), not only affect the day-to-day work of accountants, but also that of non-accountants
such as tax advisors. From the perception of the tax advisors who confront regulations which are not
‘theirs’, we show how their internal responses evolve and tread a fine line between contestation and
collaboration with their colleague accountants/auditors. Using a boundary work perspective, we ex-
amine this shift in responses and explain how tensions between professional groups may be reduced.
Overall, our study not only furthers our insights into the internal dynamics behind professional ser-
vice firms’ external responses, but also sheds light on why professional groups stay on board despite
unfavorable internal conditions.
K E Y W O R D S : accounting firms; Big 4; tax advisory; PSFs; boundary work; tax advisory; internal dy-
namics; institutional pressures
I N T R O D U C T I O N
Various theorists have related the success and socie-
tal influence of the large accounting firms to their
ability to ‘colonize’ other fields such as law, tax, fo-
rensic accounting, and consultancy (Lawrence 1999;
Suddaby and Greenwood 2001, 2005; Greenwood
and Suddaby 2002, 2006; Taminiau, Heusinkveld
and Cremer 2019). Theorists have noted that some
of these multidisciplinary professional service firms
(PSFs) have grown into powerful social actors and
have even become larger and more internationalized
than many of the clients they serve (Boussebaa
2009; Malhotra and Morris 2009; Empson, Muzio
and Broschak 2015; Shore and Wright 2018;
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Boussebaa and Faulconbridge 2019). As such, an im-
portant stream of research work has explored how
these firms are not only subjected to institutional
pressures (Lander et al. 2013), but also play a role in
maintaining and reshaping institutions (Suddaby and
Viale 2011; Muzio, Brock and Suddaby 2013).
Yet, while a growing number of studies have ad-
vanced our understanding of how PSFs relate to
their broader institutional context (Suddaby and
Muzio 2015), we know relatively little about how
large accounting firms, such as the Big 4, deal with
the related internal dynamics. For instance, Pache
and Santos (2010: 473) emphasized that more re-
search is needed on the organizational skills for han-
dling these internal dynamics and related
competences in order to achieve: ‘a better position
to survive and thrive in the midst of conflicting insti-
tutional demands’. The relative absence of research
related to the ongoing internal dynamics between
professional groups in understanding the scale and
influence of large multidisciplinary accounting firms
is particularly remarkable in the light of at least two
distinct developments.
First, the limited attention paid to the internal dy-
namics of professional groups is noteworthy, given
the assumed evolving power of professional groups
other than auditing. In the last few years, the Big 4
re-entered the more lucrative consultancy market
and expanded again in the advisory services market
and are still expanding in new areas of expertise, in
particular, more into tax advice, IT (Information
Technology), and in law (The Economist 2013,
2015, 2018). Yet, migration into other jurisdictions
enhances the likelihood of contestation between dif-
ferent professions within these accounting firms
(Carnegie and Napier 2010; Muzio, Brock and
Suddaby 2013; Shore and Wright 2018), which may
have a bearing on organizational outcomes
(Feyereisen and Goodrick 2019). These tensions
have already been signaled by Greenwood and
Hinings in 1996: ‘(. . .) management consultants in
several accounting firms became dissatisfied with
their interests and began to question the organiza-
tional assumptions of how things were done (i.e.,
their commitment to the template-in-use, which fa-
vored the accounting profession, began to erode)’
(Greenwood and Hinings 1996: 1036). In relation
to this, Greenwood et al. (2011: 356) consider the
handling of the evolving relationships between differ-
ent professional groups within multidisciplinary
organizations: ‘as an important yet underexamined
question that deserve serious attention’.
Second, the current lack of detail devoted by
researchers to the inter-professional dynamics in
large accounting firms is also remarkable given the
evolving and competing institutional pressures that
are exerted on them (Lander, Koene and Linssen
2013). For instance, the assumed weakening of the
internal position of the accounting/auditing profes-
sion is driven partly by the increased regulatory soci-
etal pressures on this profession and the more recent
stringent regulations on the accounting profession
aimed at enhancing the independence of accountants
(Shore and Wright 2018). Indeed, Big 4 firms in-
creasingly have to distinguish themselves from their
competitors for instance during tendering processes,
while at the same time, they have to conform to in-
stitutional norms and regulations so as to be
regarded as legitimate in the field (Deephouse 1999;
D’Aunno, Succi, and Alexander 2000). This can lead
to multiple heterogeneous and even conflicting insti-
tutional demands and logics which permeate organi-
zations internally (Pache and Santos 2010, 2013;
Viale, Gendron and Suddaby 2017).
In response to these shortcomings, and in order
to develop an enhanced advanced view of the success
and influence of large accounting firms, such as the
Big 4 accounting firms, there is a need to further our
understanding of the internal dynamics of these
organizations, particularly how they: ‘manage rela-
tionships across specializations, how those relation-
ships evolve, and with what implications, are
important yet underexamined questions that deserve
serious attention’ (Greenwood et al. 2010: 356).
Accordingly, our main research question is as fol-
lows: how do external pressures affect the internal dy-
namics of multidisciplinary accounting firms?
To this end, we focus on the impact of the intro-
duction of the Dutch Audit Profession Act imple-
mented from the 1 January 2013. This regulatory
pressure sought to enforce mandatory audit firm ro-
tation every 10 years for mainly large corporate cli-
ents and restrict non-audit services. The
combination of mandatory accountant rotation and a
strict separation of audit service and advice for the
same client enhance tends to exacerbate tensions
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between different professionals within large account-
ing firms. In particular, a recurrent ‘carousel’ of cor-
porate clients changing their auditors has potentially
important consequences for adjacent professions—
such as tax advisory—as they reposition themselves
vis-à-vis each other. In other words, these pressures
on the accounting profession caused by accounting
legislation can be expected to cause ‘collateral dam-
age’ for an adjacent profession within multidiscipli-
nary PSFs, such as the Big 4 firms, as tax advisors
unavoidably lose a substantial number of their clients
when the latter move on to their accounting
colleagues.
One way to understand the internal dynamics be-
tween different professional groups related to exter-
nal pressures is through the active process of
boundary work. Indeed, studying boundary work
strategies is widely considered instrumental to en-
hance our understanding of how different profes-
sions relate to one another (Bucher et al. 2016;
Boussard 2018; Bos-de Vos, Lieftink and Lauche
2019). Thus, examining the evolving internal dynam-
ics based on a boundary work perspective enables a
sound explanation of how and why, within large ac-
counting firms, tax advisors, in spite of potentially
disadvantageous developments that external pres-
sures may cause, may stay ‘on board’.
Based on 23 in-depth interviews with 19 high-
level informants from 2 different professional groups
(accounting and tax) in Dutch Big 4 firms, this arti-
cle examines the impact of accountancy regulations
on the firms’ internal dynamics. The analysis reveals
how an essentially critical attitude from an adjacent
profession such as tax advisory within Big 4, may
evolve over time from contestation to collaborative
modus with auditors as a joint response to poten-
tially unfavorable regulations. As such, this study
advances our understanding of the responses of large
multidisciplinary PSFs to institutional pressures
(Lander, Koene and Linssen 2013) by showing that
their continued acquiesce to regulation may have im-
portant implications for the internal dynamics which
may potentially undermine these firms’ viability
(Feyereisen and Goodrick 2019). In addition, by
explaining how the initial tensions between profes-
sional groups may be reduced through the active de-
ployment of boundary work strategies, we also
extend our insights into why professional groups
remain with the firm despite potentially unfavorable
conditions.
The next section contains our theoretical frame-
work after which we elaborate on the methods and
the research data. Our findings are then presented,
followed by the discussion and conclusion.
I N S T I T U T I O N A L P R E S S U R E S A N D T H E
C O M P L E X I T I E S O F M U L T I D I S C I P L I N A R Y
A C C O U N T I N G F I R M S
A growing stream of research has focused on how
professions relate to processes of institutionalization.
Studies have shown how professional organizations
and PSF not only play a role in maintaining institu-
tions (Reed 2018), but may also drive and shape
field-level institutional changes (Scott 2008; Muzio,
Brock and Suddaby 2013; Suddaby and Muzio
2015). In turn, professionals are also subjected to in-
stitutional pressures. As Muzio, Brock and Suddaby
(2013: 700, emphasis added) have noted: ‘profes-
sions are thus not only key mechanisms for, but also
primary targets of institutional change’. For instance,
Greenwood and Hinings (1996: 1027) revealed that
the main reason why the accounting profession has
adopted the partnership model of law firms was that
it was regarded as a socially accepted way of working.
In addition, Lander, Koene and Linssen (2013) ex-
amined how different accounting firms had to deal
with competing institutional logics. In line with an
influential stream of work in institutional theory that
has focused on the degree of agency that organiza-
tions have in dealing with institutional pressures
(Oliver 1991; Pache and Santos 2010), Lander,
Koene and Linssen (2013) have shown how these
PSFs vary substantially in their responses to conflict-
ing institutional demands.
Understanding responses to institutional pressure
is of particular interest with regard to multidiscipli-
nary PSFs such as large accounting firms. Indeed,
these firms have played an important role in getting
‘combining multiple professions in a single firm’
(Suddaby and Greenwood 2005: 36) socially ac-
cepted. Yet, at the same time, a number of studies
have indicated that the migration to other profes-
sional jurisdictions (Abbott 1988; Suddaby and
Greenwood 2001) is associated with significant com-
plexity, not least given that it unavoidably entails
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including different professions and occupations
whose members are socialized in distinct ways, repre-
sent substantially different norms and values, and are
likely to promote conflicting interests (Heusinkveld
et al. 2018). Moreover, theorists have also indicated
that these groups’ possible dissatisfaction with how
their interests are accommodated likely have a bear-
ing on outcomes (Feyereisen and Goodrick 2019); it
may be an important cue for organizational change
and even constitute a basis for a breakup, or even the
end of a firm (Greenwood and Hinings 1996; Pache
and Santos 2010).
Indeed, various studies associate combining these
multiple professions with both the collaboration as
well as the contestation (Heusinkveld et al. 2018).
For example, Greenwood et al. (2010) emphasize
the collaborations that take place between the affili-
ates within the global networks of the Big 4 account-
ing firms. They show how, for example, EY as one of
the Big 4 is divided into three pillars on a global basis
as follows: (1) different geographic regions; (2) dif-
ferent lines of services; and (3) different industries/
sectors (Greenwood et al. 2010:175). In order to
help global clients such as BP or Shell, the members
of the global network collaborate within and across
these pillars to become part of cross-border learning
and knowledge communities. The main factor that
binds the global network together relates to the con-
cept of reciprocity. Members of the network invest
in time and energy (give and take) even if this ap-
proach means lending out specialist for a specific pe-
riod. In general, the support of colleagues around the
world helps to further the interests of the firm a
whole (Greenwood et al. 2010: 177). At the same
time, such collaborative practices in multidisciplinary
accounting firms have become highly contested, and
considered one of the main reasons for Arthur
Andersen’s downfall; over time there was too much
emphasis on cross-selling, performance, and sales be-
tween their main practice areas—audit, tax, and ad-
ministrative services. This was particularly triggered
by the Administrative Services Division turning into
Andersen consulting, where the primary focus for
the consultants became: ‘doing the job as quickly as
possible and making the most money’ (Niece and
Trompeter 2004: 198). The traditional auditors, in
order to keep up with their colleague consultants
bringing in a large part of the overall revenue of the
firm, began to place a greater focus on generating
business from the more lucrative non-audit service,
which was ultimately detrimental to audit quality
(Niece and Trompeter 2004: 201). The downfall of
their major client Enron, for which they provided
consultancy and auditing work simultaneously, also
meant the end of Arthur Andersen. The Big 5 be-
came Big 4.
In contrast, theorists have also indicated that
these groups’ possible dissatisfaction with how their
interests are accommodated can ultimately under-
mine the financial viability of a firm (Greenwood
and Hinings 1996; Pache and Santos 2010). For in-
stance, Pache and Santos (2010) explained the split-
ting of Booz Allen Hamilton in 2009 into Booz &
Company and Carlyle Group as triggered primarily
by the fact that this PSF included different professio-
nals operating in distinct institutional and market
environments. One part of the firm focused on cor-
porate and government assignments, whereas an-
other part focused on assignments provided by
military and the ministry of defence. The first line of
consultancy was based on short-term assignments,
flexible teams, and knowledge-sharing between dif-
ferent projects. The second line of consultancy has
been based on long-term assignments and a more se-
cretive culture, as the information these consultants
had to deal with is mostly confidential in nature. The
two cultures were increasingly growing apart. This
was particularly the case when the defence line of
consultancy started to earn more revenue after 9/11
than the other division. After a final and desperate at-
tempt in 2006 to consolidate the two divisions via a
campaign called ‘One Firm Evolution’, the firm split
into Booz & Company and the Carlyle Group a few
years later.
Yet, despite a growing number of institutional
scholars who stressed the general importance of in-
ternal organizational dynamics in order to further
understanding on why organizations develop a spe-
cific strategic reaction (Greenwood and Hinings
1996; Reay, Golden-Biddle and Germann 2006;
Delmas and Toffel 2008; Pache and Santos 2010;
Peters and Heusinkveld 2010), we know little about
how external pressures affect the internal dynamics
of multidisciplinary accounting firms. Greenwood
and Hinings (1996), for example, explain how exter-
nal pressures from the market and from the
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institutional context together explain the internal dy-
namic and ultimately the pressures to change within
an organization. In line with this, Lander, Koene and
Linssen (2013: 144) called for more micro-level
work on how accounting firms: ‘experiment with the
development of novel practices following changes in
the inter-institutional system’. Given the complexi-
ties of multidisciplinary PSFs, institutional pressure
can have major repercussions for the internal rela-
tionships, positioning, and demarcation strategies of
different professions (Pache and Santos 2010, 2011;
Smets, Morris and Greenwood 2012). It is interest-
ing, therefore, not only to analyze how within the or-
ganizational boundaries of multidisciplinary PSFs
professional groups are confronted with distinct
interests, norms, values, and power issues
(Greenwood and Hinings 1996), but also analyze
how an exogenous coercive pressure such as regula-
tion, affects the day-to-day work of auditors/
accountants, while simultaneously having a bearing
on the work of tax advisors and their inter-
professional relationship. To address this issue, we
turn to a boundary work perspective below.
B O U N D A R Y W O R K A N D P R O F E S S I O N S
Boundaries and boundary work (Gieryn 1999,
Halffman 2003; Zietsma and Lawrence 2010) have
been generally considered as critical to understand
how professions relate to each other. As Bos-de Vos,
Lieftink and Lauche (2019: 130) have stated: ‘pro-
fessions represent an area in which boundary work is
particularly salient’. In the context of professions and
professional work, boundaries have been strongly as-
sociated with jurisdictional claims (Abbott 1988).
Indeed, research has long been concerned with how
particular professions and professionals have domi-
nated particular areas of work and fields of knowl-
edge via the establishment and maintenance of
professional boundaries (Heusinkveld et al. 2018).
By means of these boundaries, a profession can pro-
tect the interests of its members, for instance,
through controlling the number of entrants into a
professional field (Saks 2016: 176). As such, these
boundaries are of particular importance not only be-
cause they relate to a profession’s immediate ‘access
to material and non-material resources’ (Bucher
et al. 2016: 498), but also to their potential influence
on various key institutions in society as a whole
(Suddaby and Viale 2011).
In enhancing our understanding of professions
and how professionals relate to each other, a growing
stream of literature has stressed the significance of
studying the micro practices in which professionals
engage in order to create, shape, change, or disrupt
boundaries that distinguish their work from the work
of others (Anteby, Chan and DiBenigno 2016;
Bucher et al. 2016; Boussard 2018; Bos-de Vos,
Lieftink, and Lauche 2019;). In this context, various
studies have explored how professions may discur-
sively construct boundaries in line with their desired
ends, thereby shedding more light on the nature and
occurrence of professions’ boundary work. One im-
portant insight that can be derived from this line of
research is that contestation over jurisdictional
boundaries is inextricably linked to collaboration be-
tween professions (Anteby, Chan and DiBenigno
2016). This stresses the need to consider how ‘pro-
fessions and occupations negotiate through contesta-
tion and collaboration’ (Heusinkveld et al. 2018:
251). For instance, the study of Bucher et al. (2016)
shows how—at the field level—different professions’
contestation of boundary claims occurs in the con-
text of efforts aimed at enhancing collaboration.
They show how, in response to possible changes in
collaboration, different medical professions may vary
significantly in the way they discursively construct ju-
risdictional boundaries at the field level. In particular,
the professions varied in their boundary definition,
proposed solutions to boundary issues, as well as
construction of themselves and other relevant profes-
sions. Bucher et al. (2016) explain this variety by
connecting the discursive boundary work strategies
to the professions’ position in the field; high-status
professions seek to use the program aimed at further
collaboration in constructing the current situation as
‘normal’, whereas lower-status professions are more
inclined to contest extant boundaries and de-mystify
higher-status professions.
A second important insight from this research
relates to the dynamic nature of professional bound-
aries and boundary work; ‘boundaries are not static’
(Bos-de Vos, Lieftink and Lauche 2019: 130).
Rather, ‘professions continually negotiate boundaries
in their desire to expand, monopolize, or protect
their autonomy’ (Bucher et al. 2016: 500).
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Depending on the strategic efforts of the actors in-
volved, boundaries can change over time, and with
different degrees of permeability. Examples of this
kind of strategic boundary work are presented by
Bos-de Vos, Lieftink and Lauche (2019: 137–138).
Based on a case study of architects working in vari-
ous collaborative projects with other professionals,
they distinguish between three different kinds of
boundary work strategies as follows: (1) Reinstating:
this refers to episodes in which a profession empha-
sizes and justifies the value of their traditional work,
based on historically established demarcation, referring
to the past as justification. In this way, the profession
distinguished its specific role compared with other
actors, through a ‘thick’ and segmented boundary of
the different roles; (2) Bending: this strategy refers to
instances in which a profession tries to expand its activ-
ities beyond the traditional role and adapts incremen-
tally to the changing environment, by performing tasks
beyond its traditional ones. Depending on the project
one can be flexible and adaptive. The boundaries and
role demarcation are more fluid, thin, and permeable;
(3) Pioneering role boundaries: in this case, the profes-
sion clearly goes beyond the boundary of the tradi-
tional role by creating new opportunities and roles and
breaking away from the existing situation. Through
this strategy boundary of the role is again ‘thick’ and
segmented with clearly demarcated roles. These
options are seen as distinct and separate.
In this study, we take this as a starting point to ana-
lyze the internal dynamics within multidisciplinary ac-
counting firms, so as to determine how one boundary
work strategy from one professional group could pro-
voke a counter-strategy from a related profession.
Although the concepts of boundaries and boundary
work have been considered a fruitful approach to un-
derstand how different professions relate, there has so
far been no research on how to provide more insight
into multidisciplinary accounting firms’ responses to
competing institutional demands, as well as their intra-
organizational implications concerning different profes-
sional groups (Greenwood and Hinings 1996).
M E T H O D S
Research context
In order to explore the implications of institutional
pressures on the intra-organizational dynamics of
multidisciplinary PSFs such as large accounting
firms, we focus on the implementation of the Dutch
Audit Act. The underlying motive behind this legisla-
tion is to improve audit quality by enhancing the in-
dependence accountants and restore societal trust in
the accountancy profession by society at large. Such
trust was severely damaged during and after the
European financial crisis in 2008. The 2008 crisis can
be regarded as a systemic one, which meant a collec-
tive failing of banks, credit agencies, supervisory au-
thorities as well accountants. After the crisis, the
authorities were looking for ways to make the finan-
cial system stronger.
The accountants were blamed for not being criti-
cal and independent enough toward their clients and
other financial institutions such as banks. The
accountants were also criticized for not warning
stakeholders of risks that large organizations were
undertaking. There were numerous examples of
firms that went bankrupt in a short time after
accountants had signed the financial statements. The
Dutch Audit Profession Act echoes the American
Sarbanes Oxley Act (2002), which was implemented
after the Enron and Arthur Andersen downfalls, and
made the CFO’s (Chief Financial Officer) and
accountants directly accountable for financial irregu-
larities and malversations.
Based on the various different sources, we are
able to give a brief outline of the central elements of
the new Dutch law known as the Dutch Audit
Profession Act (NBA 2012; AFM 2013; Tapestry
Network/EY 2014). This act imposes an 8-year audit
rotation period and severely restricts the provision of
non-audit services. The law applies to public interest
entities (PIEs). Examples of Dutch PIEs are compa-
nies listed on a regulated market in the European
Union (EU), plus banks, central credit institutions,
and insurers with registered offices in the
Netherlands, and entities falling into certain catego-
ries designated by the Ministry of Finance. The new
law does not apply to small- and medium-sized
enterprises. It also does not apply to Dutch
subsidiaries of a foreign PIE, unless the Dutch sub-
sidiary itself qualifies as a Dutch PIE. The total num-
ber of organizations affected by this legislation is
about a thousand. Because the vast majority of firms
had the same accountant for over 8 years, they all
had to change in one large rotation, concerning
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mainly the large accounting firms, such as the Big 4,
since they dominate >90% of this specific market
segment (FD 2014).
The restrictions on nonaudit services took effect
on 1 January 2013, and mandatory rotation on 1
January 2016. The rotation of PIE’s therefore had to
take place over a very short time frame of only 3
years. Obviously, PIE’s are more interesting and lu-
crative clients, but they are also more complex. For
example, considering the complexity involved with
large, complex, global public companies, such as
Ahold, AirFrance-KLM, AkzoNobel, Heineken, ING,
Philips, Shell, Unilever, etc., tendering and transition
under the new law created high pressure not only for
the Big 4 firms, but also for the PIE clients. These
companies are listed on the AEX 25 index of the
Dutch stock exchange in Amsterdam. But overall,
there are about 30 corporate clients that are regarded
flagships clients by the large accounting firms. The
Dutch legislation is more restrictive than the recently
passed EU guideline (nr. 537/2014), which allows
(as an option for member states) longer tenure peri-
ods of 10 years and places fewer restrictions on non-
audit services. In line with this EU guideline, the
Dutch audit rotation was subsequently adjusted to
10 years.
With regard to enforcement of the restrictions on
non-audit services still permitted, are services includ-
ing factfinding services for external users (such as
regulators) and the supervisory board, as well as a
number of specific audit and assurance services, but
‘All other types of engagement, including the compi-
lation of financial statements and the provision of ad-
visory services (such as tax advice, management
advice, and merger and acquisition) will no longer
be permitted by the auditor’ (NBA alert 27, 2012 in
Tapestry Network/EY 2014: 2). In practice, this
means that pure auditing—also called channel 1—
can no longer be combined with advisory accounting
services called ‘channel 2’. In the traditional business
model, the strength of the accountant lay in the link
between channel 1, the results of the audit, and chan-
nel 2, advice on the optimal way of organizing and
implementing the processes. The latter is no longer
possible. An accountant who sees opportunities for
improving the audit process will have to advise his
client to seek advice at a competitor.
In the period of analysis, external coercive pres-
sure on the accountancy remained unchanged. In the
view of the Dutch Authority for the Financial
Markets (AFM) as a supervisory authority, the ac-
counting firms still lack a sense of urgency and are
not sufficiently in control with regard to safeguarding
the quality of audit files. Therefore, despite criticism
by the Big 4 representatives concerning the strin-
gency and speed of implementation of the Audit Act
and the huge costs involved in the preparatory phase
of the audit tenders, the overall regulatory environ-
ment remains unsatisfactory.
Data collection
To gain more insight into the regulatory pressures
and formal firm-level responses, we started our data
collection by scanning media publications on the
Dutch Audit Act. In particular, we selected a large
number of relevant publications in a leading Dutch
financial newspaper, Financieele Dagblad (FD),
articles on the website accountant.nl, industry publi-
cations, as well as report from the Dutch regulator
AFM, and documents from the Netherlands Institute
of Chartered Accountants NBA.
The inclusion of the analysis from FD was of par-
ticular interest as this financial newspaper displayed
considerable interest in issues that concern the
Dutch Big 4 accounting firms. The search in the
newspaper database LexisNexis for additional FD
articles was conducted using the general keywords
‘regulation and accountants’ for a period extending
from 2010 to 2019. This search resulted into 304
articles, ranging from half a page to two pages. The
reason to start in 2010 and finish our search in 2019
was to be able to become aware of discussions run-
ning up to the implementation in 2013, as well as
possible current debates which can be traced back to
the implementation of the Audit Act. The height of
the discussion, however, was in the period 2012–6.
From this initial search, we made a selection (delet-
ing small incidents or mainly unrelated issues),
resulting in 159 more focused articles (339 pages)
that dealt directly with the development of regula-
tion and auditing and its impact on other peripheral
professions. The content varied, including factual in-
formation, interviews with key players, background
articles, as well as opinions of thought leaders. Since,
we are mostly interested in the way accountants
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conveyed their views on the Audit Act in the same
period of the interviews, we were therefore able to
reduce to the number of articles to 54 core ones.
These insights provided additional background to
the interviews that were conducted in the field
(Table 1).
To better understand the internal dynamics behind
the formal firm-level responses, we used the network
of one of the authors, and engaged in ‘snowballing’
and purposive sampling in finding theoretically rele-
vant informants (Ritchie et al. 2013). Within this pro-
cess, we sought a mix of people who were employed
by the Big 4 accounting firms in the Netherlands
(Deloitte, EY, KPMG, PwC) and included auditing
professionals as well as members from other profes-
sions, such as consultancy and tax advisory. In total,
23 interviews with 19 senior professionals were con-
ducted, spread over all the four accounting firms, dur-
ing a 3-year period (2014–6); four informants (tax
partners) were interviewed twice. Of the 19 inform-
ants, 18 were partners, one a senior director, and 1
had recently retired as a partner. Of the active part-
ners, three were members or chairman of their respec-
tive Boards of Directors and one of them had just
stepped down from his membership of the board at
the time of the interview. In addition, the chairman
and the former chairman of the professional body of
tax advisors were interviewed. Of the 23 interviews,
17 were held with tax advisors and 6 with accountants.
Four tax partners were interviewed twice over the
consecutive years of the research. The active partners
involved in this research were all involved in tendering
processes of PIE clients (Table 2).
Performing the in-depth interviews in subsequent
years (2014, 2015, and 2016) enabled us to develop
a more accurate view of the overall shifts in
responses to legislation by the different accounting
firms, as well as the changing internal dynamics
among the different professional groups. The inter-
views lasted 60 min on average. The topics list that
we used included various sets of questions. One set
of questions related to the overall impact (or upcom-
ing) of the Act and its two parts such as: How did
the implementation of the regulation take place?
Can you tell us to what extent the Act had an impact
on your work? What was the impact on the relation-
ship with other professions? Another set of questions
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related to responses to the demands such as: Are
there different strategies with regard to the tender
processes? Did your organization anticipate the regu-
lation and the next round of rotation? In dealing
with these questions each year, the topic of the inter-
nal dynamic became more prominent. Additionally,
the importance of the ‘One Firm’ concept gradually
became apparent. This was particularly relevant for
the members of the boards who were interviewed
over the last 2 years of the project. In other words,
our focus gradually moved from a general interest in
the different professions to a more focused interest
in their interaction in terms of contestation as collab-
oration, as this paper focuses on the position and
perspective of the tax advisors, as this professional
group is of theoretical interest, given its assumed
ability to deal with regulatory changes (Seabrook
and Wigan 2015; Thiemann and Lepoutre 2017;
Radcliffe et al. 2018; Christensen 2020).
Data analysis
Our analysis of the interviews and the supplementary
secondary documents focused primarily on the way
informants responded to the implementation of the
legislation. As pointed out in the section on data col-
lection, the transcripts constitute the core of our em-
pirical research and were supplemented by our
analysis of the secondary sources. We had different
coding phases (Babbie 2007) to categorize and com-
pare the empirical material. First, the transcripts and
the publications in the professional journals were read
carefully and coded manually, so as to get a sense of
the data and to develop a chronological order of the
main perceived stages and related events in the evolu-
tion of the legislation implementation and inter-
professional dynamics. A central element in this
phased approach involved the shifts in the power posi-
tion between the different professions over time, dur-
ing period following the implementation.
Table 2. Overview of informants
# Big 4 accounting firm Function Profession Year
1 A Partner Audit (1) 2014
2 D Partner Tax (1) 2014
3 C Partner Audit (2) 2014
4 D (Ex)-Partner Audit (3) 2014
5 B Partner Tax (2) 2014
6 C Partner Tax (3) 2014
7 A Partner Tax (4) 2015
8 C Partner Tax (5) 2015
9 D Partner Tax (6) 2015
10 B Partner (ex-member of Board) Tax (7) 2015
11 D Senior Director Tax (8) 2015
12 C Partner (¼6) Tax (9) 2015
13 A Partner (member of the Board) Tax (10) 2015
14 E Partner Tax (11) 2015
15 C Partner Audit (4) 2016
16 A Partner Audit (5) 2016
17 A Partner Audit (6) 2016
18 D Partner (member of the Board) Tax (18) 2016
19 B Partner Tax (19) 2016
20 C Partner Tax (20) 2016
21 B Partner (¼ 5) Tax (21) 2016
22 B Partner (¼ 10) Tax (22) 2016
23 D Partner (¼ 9) Tax (23) 2016
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Second, we began open-coding these slices of
data with Atlas-ti. We coded the different ways in
which the members from different firms (account-
ants, tax advisors, and consultants) perceived the ef-
fect of regulation and the internal dynamics it
engendered. Our focus moved gradually from a gen-
eral interest in all three professions to a more fo-
cused interest in the tax advisors, as this particular
group appeared to ‘suffer’ significantly from operat-
ing in a large accounting firm compared with their
competitors who were not associated with account-
ants. The apparent tension between the different
professional groups suggested major competing log-
ics within these firms. We accomplished this part of
the study by coding and comparing more specific
sections of our material that described the following
topics: the different responses to regulatory pres-
sures and the coping strategies of tax advisors in
dealing with losing clients because of the rotation
and enhanced internal pressures.
Third, to better understand the key actors’ posi-
tions, we interpreted the coded fragments in terms
of strategic responses. Initially in our coding, we
were informed by the conceptual model of Pache
and Santos (2010) enabling us to analyze how the
internal representations shifted over time and how
the internal power relations between the dominant
profession and peripheral professions played out in
terms of manipulation and compromise strategies.
We then shifted our theoretical backdrop to bound-
ary work, as this enabled us to better understand
how and why external pressures would lead to battles
for jurisdictional control in relation to broader
organizational-level cues for collaboration. By then
constantly comparing the data with the theory of
boundary work, we moved from more descriptive
codes to more abstract ones, thereby revealing how
the responses (in terms of boundary work) shifted in
power over time between the different professions,
and how they are related to different perceived stages
in the evolving field dynamics. The concept of
boundary work helped us to open up the black box;
happens inside a multidisciplinary accounting firm
which has to respond to major external pressures?
From this coding process, a two-phase model
emerged. Finally, we critically evaluated the emerg-
ing phase-model by referring back to the empirical
fragments and constantly comparing and contrasting
the different accounts of the impact of accounting
regulations from the different representatives of the
peripheral profession, the tax advisors.
F I N D I N G S
Based on our analysis of the interview data, we found
that the tax advisors were indirectly affected by the
regulations primarily targeted at the accountancy
profession, which came into effect on the 1 January
2013. The accounting firms were given till the 1
January 2016 to realize the compulsory accountant
rotation for all PIE’s. Nonetheless, this transition pe-
riod of 3 years, was regarded as extremely short by
the Big 4 accountants, and experienced as a Big Bang
and associated with considerable uncertainty.
From the perspective of tax advisors, facing with
the loss of a large number of clients caused by com-
pulsory rotation, indicated the accountants’ power-
play, as they demanded that the tax advisors
abandon a number of their corporate clients. The tax
advisors felt sidelined and were not pleased, indeed
annoyed by the way their colleague accountants be-
haved in what they regarded as a selfish and autono-
mous manner. The accountants justified their
behavior on the basis of past position and applied a
reinstating strategy, reinforcing the value of the his-
tory and origins of the accounting firms. The tax
advisors complained to the board of directors of
their respective firms, but mostly their criticisms
were not really taken seriously. However, over time,
the different professions moved toward, and a more
inclusive approach, which became more institutional-
ized with the introduction of the One-Firm concept
by the Board of Directors. The tax advisors gradually
started to have a larger say in the way in which the
large accounting firms responded to the new regula-
tion, and became more and more involved in the dis-
cussions on how to deal with the rotation of audit
clients. In the first place, the tax advisors applied a
bending strategy. In the evaluation of the accounting
regulations, the tax advisors became generally more
positive as new clients were won and new inter-
professional collaborations were created, leading to
pioneering role boundary work by tax advisors. In
their view, regulation such as the compulsory rota-
tion of accountants also creates new business oppor-
tunities. Within this shifting and evolving inter-
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profession dynamics, we can distinguish between
two stages. The remainder of this section discusses
and illustrates how external pressures such as regula-
tion lead to contestation and collaboration in rela-
tion to these two stages: Stage 1 as a reactive phase
by accountants: reinstating their traditional positions
and Stage 2: new practice development through
bending and pioneering role boundaries (Table 3).
Stage 1: Contestation
In the next few paragraphs, we will elaborate the dif-
ferent reinstating activities by accountants supported
by the Boards of Directors which led to contestation
between the different professions such as tax
advisors.
Reinstating (accountants and Board of Directors)
From the perspective of the tax advisors, the
accountants were uncertain how to deal with the
compulsory rotation. Therefore, the accountants,
driven by commercial needs and as the leading pro-
fession, became the explicitly dominant profession
by trying to take control, according to the principle
that accounting should ‘always come first’ or an ‘au-
dit tender is an audit party’. In other words, the
accountants claimed ownership of potential clients
by defining boundaries between themselves and
other professions. While doing so, they were impos-
ing hierarchical top-down enforcement tactics on the
tax advisors, as a higher-status profession than others
within the same firm. The accountants’ powerful in-
ternal position within the Big 4 accounting firms,
with strong representation and support in their
boards, is based on institutional historical founda-
tions of the large accounting firms as well as the
overall strength of their profession.
From the onset of the implementation of the
Audit Act, the tax advisors suddenly realized they
were restricted in their work because of their liaison
with accountants and had to let go own clients to
accountants. For accountants winning audit tenders
became their first priority.
‘Traditionally, the audit tender is really an audit
party, all the blinkers are put on and there is only
one thing that is important: to win the tender.’
(Respondent 18)
The dominance of the accountants was criticized
by the tax advisors as putting the interests of
accountants above the interests of professional col-
leagues with another professional background, and
even above the interest of clients. As one of the tax-
advisor recalls:
‘In principle, accounting was always considered to
have priority. You can easily tell this by the way
the corporate market is approached for (by our
organization): solely from an accounting perspec-
tive. In the preliminary stage, we once were delib-
erating with a client about fiscal issues, but they
blew the whistle on us because accounting always
has priority. The client’s needs should be leading,
not ours, but within the organization, pride plays
a role as well. And the rule is that accounting
should always come first. This is reflected by how
the process is managed: rather than focusing on
the client’s needs, the client is often steered in a
certain direction. One or the other segment in the
organization comes first. That is actually not a
good thing.’ (Respondent 19)
For example, this is the case when a tax advisor
has to give up lucrative clients to colleague
accountants:
‘Audit tender takes priority over others, and be-
cause advisory commissions are not allowed to
proceed once an audit tender is won.’
(Informant 14)
Contestation to reinstating (tax advisors)
The tax advisors mainly complained that they are
losing clients due to the accountants’ interference
and control over clients. If a corporate client sends a
Request for Proposal to participate in an audit ten-
der, then it is difficult for the accountants receiving
the invitation not to participate in the tender process
and to reject the invitation. Because of this pressure
on the side of the client and eagerness by account-
ants to participate, the tax advisors felt sidelined and
placed at a disadvantage. Soon after the implementa-
tion of the regulation, the tax advisors realized that
the new accounting regulations not only had implica-
tions for the accountants but also for them.
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Table 3. The different stages: from contestation to collaboration
Stages Stage 1: contestation Shifting panels: pressures
and drivers for change
Stage 2: collaboration
Key actors
Accountants Reinstating by accountants
and board of Directors
! Under high pressure





blinded by the audit
tenders
! Historical and institu-
tional advantage, and
awareness of having the






their tax colleagues to
ask for advice and
knowledge-sharing
about clients
Acceptance of bending by
tax advisors
! Investment in and en-
gagement of different
professional roles with
the audit process: tax
advisors invited to take
a specialist role (sub-
contractor) within an
audit tender and assign-
ment (bending)




!By law, the majority of
board members of ac-
counting firms remain
accountants
Realization of a need for
interventions
! Diminished support by
the board for ‘audit
comes first’ and greater
support for a more bal-
anced approach: reali-
zation that there is a
need to balance
Channel 1 (audit) and
2 (non-audit) services.
! Realization by the
board that the client is
the one in charge and
might even take advan-
tage of the uncertainty
caused by the regula-
tion (reducing audit
fees during the rotation
process and trying to
play the different pro-
fessions off against each
other by issuing audit
and advisory tenders at
the same time)
Stimulate bending and pio-
neering by organizational
innovations
! Introduction of One-
Firm concept






! Creation of client lead
partner role
(pioneering)
Tax advisors Contestation to reinstating
! Financial loss for tax
advisors:
Recognition of importance
of the role of accountants
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Table 3. Continued
Stages Stage 1: contestation Shifting panels: pressures




the fees are mostly higher
than accountant’s fees
! ‘Not our regulations’.
The tax advisors are in-
dependent and work
for the interests of the
client, as its main stake-
holder. The regulator
did not take account of





! Regulation has a nega-
tive consequence for





advantages to stay on
board
! Stability of income
through long-term au-
dit projects
! Reputation and brand-
ing of audit corporate
client (due to interna-
tional network of
accountants)




such as CFO and Audit
Committee members.
! Realization that sacri-
fice by the different
professional groups is
necessary for the collec-
tive (give and take)
! The tax advisors in-
form and educate their
corporate clients about
the constraints caused
by, and possibilities cre-
ated by the regulations,
by explaining to them
that they need to bal-
ance their professional
services portfolio, based
on their client’s needs.
! Tax advisors are stimu-
lated to participate in
the audit tender pro-
cess. In the case the au-
dit tender is lost it may
still lead to tax advisory
assignment in the fu-
ture by leaving a good
impression
At times, tax advisors are
prioritized because of:
! client’s wishes,
! the tax advisor’s as-
signment is too lucra-





! lack of client relation-
ship development with
audit client
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‘It does affect tax advisors. You find yourself in a
situation where you have to stop your work
because of an audit tender. When you lose your
client you will have to start all over again. That
makes it complicated.’ (Informant 8)
This frustration is expressed well here:
‘It does not matter how much your profit contri-
bution to the company is compared to account-
ants.’ (Informant 20)
For accountants, winning audit tenders became
their first priority. With the implementation of the
Audit Act, the regulator did not take account of the
already existing intense collaboration between the
different professions. The tax advisors suddenly real-
ized they were restricted in their work because of
their liaison with accountants and the fact that they
had to let their own clients go to the accountants.
‘When the regulations (for accountants) were
drawn up, not enough attention was paid to the
intense collaborations in which the majority of
tax advisors take part.’ (Informant 9)
The tax advisors were also critical of the fact that
they had to adhere to regulations directed to a pro-
fession other than theirs.
‘And look, there is a difference. The reason this
Audit Act is implemented has to do with problems
related to audit quality. It’s purely about audit.
We as tax advisors we have nothing to do with it.’
(Informant 7)
Several times the tax advisors expressed the feel-
ing that they are confronted with a ‘problem’ which
they did not create:
‘And what you then saw is first the accountant
stressing the importance of regulation: “This is
allowed, that is not allowed”. Then came a num-
ber of tax advisors who have an opinion on the is-
sue and even became more papist than the Pope.
While in my view it’s an accountancy issue, it be-
came our problem’ (Informant 14).
The fact that accountants were mostly backed by
the Board of Directors was perceived as unfair by tax
advisors and they linked the dominance of account-
ants to the governance structure.
‘ (. . .) we are from our origins an auditing firm.
We are under supervision of the AFM (The Dutch
Authority for the Financial Markets); therefore,
accountants should form more than 50% of the
members in the board’ (Informant 14).
The tax advisors criticized the lack of a level play-
ing field compared with tax advisors who are embed-
ded in a law firm. Law firms even advertise they are
not linked to and dependent on accountants.
‘You even see it in the way do their marketing.
You should have a look at the website of law firms
with tax advisors. Then you see they state
“independent office”’ (Informant 7).
The tax advisors mentioned that their profession
is based on the notion of independence. Suddenly,
they have to adhere to regulations which are not
theirs and had comply with intensive administration
from the regulator. The tax advisors are members of
their own professional body, the Dutch Association
of Tax Advisors (NOB, Nederlandse Orde van
Belastingsadviseurs) and follows the guidelines and
principles of their own professional body organiza-
tion. In contrast accountants are accountable to a
larger number of (societal) stakeholders.
as a profession we (tax advisors) are not regu-
lated. The accountants are. They obviously also
have a public role. They have to be held account-
able to society. While we as tax advisors don’t
have that. We are client-oriented. That doesn’t
mean we have our back to society. Not at all. But
we have to advise our clients the best we can with
their reporting obligations, concept reporting, tax
returns and advise them on these issues among
others (Informant 8).
Overall, the contestation at this stage was central
to the relationship between the two groups of profes-
sions. However, over time, the tax advisors gradually
also started to focus on the clients that one can win.
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Of course, there is great tension between audit
and advisory. Advisory is simply losing work. But
anyway, you win some and you lose some
(Informant 13).
Shifting panels: Pressures and drivers for change
Reducing reinstating (accountants)
After the first period of learning from the first experi-
ences of the audit tenders of corporate clients by the
large accounting firms, the unbalanced situation be-
tween the different professions shift toward a situa-
tion in which the power distribution became more
balanced. Regarding the accountants, they felt the
need to get in contact with new clients and therefore
needed to get in touch with colleagues from other
professions so as to get to know these clients.
Without any previous knowledge of the potential cli-
ents and without relationships, it is difficult to win.
One of the first things we do when a call for ten-
ders is issued, is to look at our existing relation-
ships with the client. These people are then imme-
diately involved in the process. Having a good
relationship with the client may be considered of
overriding importance for winning a tender
(Informant 12).
Realization of need of interventions (Boards of
Directors)
Gradually, the Boards of Directors of the individual
firms started to realize that if they win too many cli-
ents at once, they can jeopardize the existing busi-
ness model which is based on the fundamental
requirement of balance between Channels 1 (ac-
countancy/audit) and 2 (nonaccountancy services),
otherwise every 10 years a particular profession
would be out of work. Alignment for the whole orga-
nization is therefore necessary, because the compul-
sory rotation causes a reallocation of the market.
What’s important is whether your market share
has remained the same, increased or decreased af-
ter this operation, both in Channel 1 and
Channel 2. That’s something that must be han-
dled strategically. It’s not something you do in the
privacy of your own little shed; it needs top-down
coordination. Not in the form of orders, but in the
form of a partnership with combined action. Of
course, they pay attention to the leadership team
here. But decisions are not made individually
(Informant 10).
The Boards of Directors started to realize that the
size of the market remains more of less the same, but
will simply be redistributed more or less equally
among the Big 4 accounting firms.
In fact, it is a question of reordering of the existing
market. The market in itself is not getting larger
(Informant 10).
However, the Board of Directors also started to
realize in this phase that the clients take advantage of
the uncertainty caused by the regulation. They no-
ticed that clients started to lower audit fees during
the rotation process and try to play the different pro-
fessions against each other by issuing audit and advi-
sory tenders at the same time, while being aware of
the fact that audit and advisory services by the same
accounting firm is not allowed to the same client si-
multaneously. In order to not be the losing party in
this bargaining game, the board encouraged a more
incorporating approach between the different profes-
sional groups. Therefore, after a period of tension
between the different professions, as perceived by
tax advisors, the Board of Directors of the large ac-
counting firms realized how important it is to find
the right balance between the two types of service
channels.
Recognition of importance of the role of accountants
(tax advisors)
In time, tax advisors were not completely immune to
the influence of arguments used by the accountants
as they realized they had no ambitions to leave the
accounting firm. From their perspective, they much
appreciated the global network of the accountants,
which attracts corporate clients. Others mention
such reasons as efficiency, and one of them explains
that the exit mode was no option to him.
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One of the greatest benefits of being together is
you share the costs, like sharing the office and
other facilities. This is of great financial benefit. If
we were to split, we would be less efficient, apart
from the decoupling and all that comes with it.
You are simply less efficient when you are two
clubs instead of one large club. There are many
reasons not to do so (Informant 7).
The tax advisors also recognized that winning au-
dit clients is good for the branding and reputation of
the whole company, as large audit clients provide
more opportunity to promote the accounting firms,
which is less the case with advisory clients.
Yes, it’s important for your own reputation, you
want large players as clients, because it means vis-
ibility on the market. That’s good for your reputa-
tion, so it is not always profit that counts
(Informant 20).
Another argument used by accountants and the
boards of directors to convince tax advisors to let
their clients go is the fact that accountants provide a
more stable source of income for the total organiza-
tion, despite their relatively lower profit margin, at
least compared with tax advisors. In contrast to the
stable and long-term assignments of accountants, the
consultancy projects are often short-lived and
uncertain.
For example, if you earn, for a period of five
years, 500.000 euros each year for an audit as-
signment, you can start to build your teams. For
advisory it could be a million euro for the first
year, but also only 100.000 euros a year later. So
the audit assignment is then more interesting
(Informant 7).
Moreover, the hierarchical level at which account-
ants operate in the client’s organization is often
higher than the level at which tax advisors are active,
since audit partners are often in direct contact with
the CFO or the audit committees of clients.
It has everything to do with relationships. Do you
have good insight into your network? You must
know who the members of the Board of Directors
and of the Supervising Board and the CFOs are
(Informant 10).
An additional reason to prioritize accountants
over tax advisors is that operating at the highest level
often opens up doors that can be of interest for con-
sultants and tax advisors in the long run, as a portal
to new advisory assignments. Therefore, looking be-
yond the period of 10 years might provide new busi-
ness opportunities for tax advisors.
Stage 2: Collaboration
In the final stage, the collaboration between the two
groups of professions became more common and
more institutionalized. Both sides were attempting to
accommodate and help out in different ways during
the process of the audit tender, whereas the Board of
Directors were more instrumental in facilitating the
collaboration with organizational interventions.
Acceptance of bending by tax advisor (accountants)
After a period of figuring out what the new regula-
tions entail, the accounting firms realized that the tax
advisors were still allowed to take on specific roles
within an audit project depending on the kind of cli-
ent, the context, effort, and commitment required. In
other words, the role of the tax advisors could still
vary from a facilitator to a subcontractor, so as to as-
sess tax positions and other work which is close to
that of an accountant.
It is a continuous search. We still share many cli-
ents, because that’s still possible. You can see that
we’re moving toward a group that only assesses
tax positions and that performs the tax-related
accounting work it involves. Which is close to an
accountant (Informant 8).
The tax advisors considered that there are still
many ways that they can work together within the
bounds allowed by the regulations than accountants
could evidently envisage. The different professionals
still find ways to work together. Tax advisors are still
allowed to do work in Channel 1. In that case, the
tax advisor takes on the role of accountant.
Conversely, the accountant can do work in Channel
2. The accountant is then not so much focused on
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audit assignment and work, and more on advisory
work: As an accountant you can do great work in
Channel 2 (Informant 10).
Stimulating bending and pioneering by
organizational innovations (Boards of Directors)
The need for coordination also became more pro-
nounced, as well as the need to implement the Audit
Act in more efficiently way. Therefore, the concept
of ‘One-Firm’ was also introduced as one concept
which meant that the different kinds of professionals
had to work together constructively so that the
whole organization would profit. The increased con-
tact between the different professionals which first
started as a way to explore the boundaries (bending
activities by tax advisors) of what was allowed since
the implementation of the new regulations, soon be-
came an approach for Big 4 accounting firms to de-
velop new business propositions and a way to
differentiate themselves.
It is a major process in which the whole market is
changing. We only do so by using a One-Firm ap-
proach, departing from one plan (Informant 29).
In the same vein, as the different professionals got
to know each other better, they passed new assign-
ments to their colleagues. The process of working to-
gether became gradually more structured, also with
organizational support. A taskforce or a commission
was created to oversee all the status of the most im-
portant corporate clients (630). This process also
entails the plotting of clients on a time-line and cen-
ters around the following questions: who are our cur-
rent main audit clients, who are the main audit
clients of our competitors? When are our and their
clients going to rotate? Or issue a request for an (au-
dit) proposal (RFP)? This commission or taskforce
operates just under the Board of Directors or one of
the Board members is responsible for overseeing the
different markets. At a more tactical level, the pro-
posal units of the large accounting firms also played
a crucial role and entailed supervising the tendering
process and sharing knowledge between the different
professionals involved. The creation of a new title,
the lead partners, is in line with a more integrated
approach. For example, a lead partner of a large PIE
client is overseeing all assignments, contact and rela-
tionships of the different professionals with this par-
ticular client. Becoming the lead partner of an audit
tender process is the ultimate example of pioneering
in which tax advisors operate beyond the traditional
role.
What we do now much more than before, is that
at three points in the process, advisory knowledge
is brought in. First, there is a kick-off during
which for a whole afternoon in a game-like situa-
tion we spar about the most important issues re-
lating to of the potential audit client. The second
thing we do is a kind of work session with advi-
sory. All advisors who have ever done something
with the client are put in a room with the audit
team. We let the advisors simply talk about the
kind of assignments they did for a specific client.
This part is tighter than the kick-off, but in this
case, means thinking more broadly. A third ele-
ment is that they have me (tax advisor) as the
lead partner, overseeing all activities related to
this specific client (Informant 8).
Beyond bending and pioneering: give and take within
collaboration (tax advisors)
Overall, in the stress and dynamics of the first round
of rotation, the tax advisors realized (at the time with
some reluctance) that the sacrifice is needed in order
to help accountants (loss of hours and cut in poten-
tial revenue for tax advisors) and the entire organiza-
tion to eventually become out stronger in unison
after the rotation. Sacrifice also means a form of al-
truism as one sacrifices one’s own time for the possi-
ble more favorable future situation for the whole
firm.
We said to our tax clients that we need to go
along with accountants once a client requests a
proposal for an audit. After all, it’s the client who
decides (Informant 5).
In this new cooperative phase, a common practice
for the tax advisors became that of collaborating in-
tensively with the accountants during a tender pro-
cess, and seeking to remain in contact with
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accountants. The exchange of knowledge became a
time-consuming process particularly for tax advisors.
This approach also consists of engaging accountants
with previous assignments and sharing client rela-
tionships with them, and going beyond the tradi-
tional boundary of the tax advisors. At times,
however, clients might prioritize the relationship
with the tax advisors of a specific accounting firm
and simply request a proposal for an audit tender
from a specific audit firm.
Sometimes a client doesn’t invite you to submit an
audit tender. That happens when we are already
working for this client, usually our tax depart-
ment, and the client is simply satisfied with our
services. For example, international tax structures
can be so complicated that, when clients are satis-
fied with our work methods, they prefer to con-
tinue that collaboration (Informant 13).
Moreover, another possibility is that that the
Board of Directors prioritizes the interests of tax
advisors as too important and lucrative for the non-
accountants. If the opinion of the Board of Directors
is that the accountants have little chance of winning,
then the focus will also be on the non-accountants.
Once we realize that there is a very small chance
of winning the audit tender, we’ll enter the process
with a different objective. Of course, you still need
to develop a tender as if you are aiming to win, so
make use of all the knowledge you have, but your
main aim will be to leave as good an impression
as possible of your organization, so that advisory
may perhaps land a tender with that client. That
way, we have more business, while at the same
time getting to know the client (Informant 9).
In the process of knowledge-sharing about poten-
tial clients, the different professions were also sharing
technical and industry knowledge which make their
value proposition for target clients more convincing
(pioneering). In the same vein, as the different pro-
fessionals got to know each other better, they started
to pass new assignments onto their colleagues. In the
case of the tax advisors, this approach consists of en-
gaging accountants with previous assignments and
sharing relationships with clients with them. Put
differently, the pressures imposed on the accountants
by stringent regulations has led to a common ap-
proach in which Big 4 organizations operate as One-
Firm toward corporate clients. This approach be-
came essential in the tender process.
We know now from several clients that they have
to change their accountants in 2016. Then we try
to transform the accountant relationship into an
advisory one (Informant 7).
It’s simply necessary to present ourselves as one
company, not just for the audit, but also regarding
our reputation for advisory services (Informant
12).
This second stage stands for the total incorpora-
tion of compliance and an implementation of this
new way of working, the development of best practi-
ces. For the appropriate implementation of Audit
Act, different ways of working were required. The
various professions were reaching out to one another
to find the optimal way of working together. After
the first round of rotation has been completed, the
large accounting firms can prepare for the next
round. New relationships can be developed and
knowledge gaps in a specific field can be closed or
experts hired, as well as new collaborations formed
between different professions. Specialists can also be
sought in order to increase the chances of winning
new clients for the next round. The rotation was fully
accomplished by the 1 January 2016, and the Big 4
managed to maintain a more or less equal share of
the top of the market. However, regulatory change
also means new business opportunities, as the differ-
ent partners described. Thus, overall, the large ac-
counting firms comply, imitate one another by all
embracing the One-Firm approach; and, over time,
the preparation for the next rotation becomes rou-
tine, based on best practices.
D I S C U S S I O N A N D C O N C L U S I O N
The success and societal influence of the large ac-
counting firms have been attributed by a number of
scholars to their ability to ‘colonize’ other fields such
as law, tax, forensic accounting, and consultancy
(Greenwood, Hinings and Brown 1990; Suddaby
and Greenwood 2001; Greenwood and Suddaby
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2006). Although we have already acquired insights
into different response strategies to external pres-
sures from different accounting firms (Lander,
Koene and Linssen 2013), we still know little about
what goes on inside these large multidisciplinary pro-
fessional services firms (Feyereisen and Goodrick,
2019). In particular, research offers little detail about
the internal dynamics between different professional
groups, and how they deal individually and jointly
with institutional complexity (Greenwood et al.
2011). Indeed, these large accounting firms are con-
sidered as arenas in which different professions, with
their own norms, values and professional logics,
compete for influence and dominance (Palmer et al.
1993; Greenwood et al. 2011). Greenwood, Hinings
and Brown (1990) have indicated the potential ten-
sions that may be associated with the rise of consul-
tancy within the Big 4: ‘In effect, there are signs of
competing “interpretive schemes” within the ac-
counting industry (. . .)’ (Greenwood, Hinings and
Brown 1990: 751). Building on this, a critical issue is
whether potential dissatisfaction on the part of these
groups with how their interests are accommodated
can be an important cue for organizational change
(Greenwood and Hinings 1996) and may even con-
stitute a basis for the breakup, or even the end of a
firm. Therefore, it is important to study the internal
dynamics between different professions within large
multidisciplinary firms, and in particular, how possi-
ble tensions that emanate from evolving institutional
demands are being resolved.
To this end, we focused on exploring how exter-
nal pressures (in this case, the implementation of the
Dutch audit act) affect the internal dynamics within
different large multidisciplinary accounting firms
from the perspective of tax advisors. Drawing on 23
in-depth interviews with 19 informants employed at
the Big 4 accounting firms, we were able to demon-
strate how general compliance— maintenance of the
same external response—to regulatory pressure is
systematically associated with evolving boundary
work between different professional groups. This is
exemplified by the reinstating of boundary-work
strategies vis-à-vis the tax advisors in Stage 1, which
was responded to by a bending and pioneering strat-
egy by the tax advisors in Stage 2.
As indicated, we identified two different stages
through which a generally contestational mode
gradually evolved into a more inclusive and collabo-
rative mode. One important element in explaining
this shift relates to the emphasis on the One-Firm
concept by the Board of Directors. Indeed, the
Boards of Directors may realize that besides the fact
that compulsory rotation caused substantial pressure
and internal uncertainty, it also encouraged clients to
renegotiate their terms of engagement, and even to
play different professional groups off against each
other. Therefore, this rotation led to an increased
need for more coordination in the overall tender
process. The introduction of the One-Firm concept
played a large part in coordinating the tender pro-
cess, which encourages the professional groups to
think more in terms of the interests of the whole. In
line with the One-Firm concept (speaking with one
voice) short-term sacrifice for the long-term benefit
of the firm as a whole is necessary. Altruism (David,
Sine and Haveman 2013) was a common approach
during the nascent stage of the consultancy market.
In this present case it means helping out, making sac-
rifices, or doing favors might be reciprocated by col-
leagues at a later stage. Again, the role of a Board of
Directors can be considered crucial in the implemen-
tation of the concept. Ultimately, this can be
expected to contribute to a more balanced approach
in which the different professions contribute to the
profits of the whole organization.
The shift into a more balanced and cooperative
approach can also be explained by the fact that even
though the accountants had a good starting position,
being able to make use of their historical and institu-
tional governance claims, the tax advisors have effec-
tively engaged in boundary work to enhance their
position. In contrast to accountancy where auditing
has become a commodity, tax advisors possess valu-
able technical–cognitive resources (Boussard 2018).
This sophisticated resource, as well as the flexible
and reflective character of the tax advisor (Radcliffe
et al. 2018), have made the shift to a more collabora-
tive mode possible. Indeed, we found evidence of
changes in the internal position of professional
groups (Bucher et al. 2016) in relation to external
demands. Being under substantial pressure caused by
the implementation of new regulations, the account-
ants relied initially and then habitually on their tradi-
tional original role as the founding profession of the
firms. However, over time, internal groups—
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including the Board of Directors— started to realize
that cooperation with tax advisors became an essen-
tial asset for winning the audit tender in the first
place. This is because of the fact that client relation-
ships at the highest level are no longer exclusive to
audit partners. The exclusive knowledge that tax
advisors possess also makes them indispensable for
differentiating the audit proposal to potential clients.
In other words, in contrast to the findings of Bucher
et al. (2016), we found that ‘higher-status’ profes-
sions, which the accountancy traditionally is in the
context of a multidisciplinary accounting firm, was
not seeking collaboration but contestation. This en-
couraged even more contestation (through direct
criticisms) by the tax advisors (originally the lower-
status profession) vis-a-vis their accountant col-
leagues. However, with the interventions of the
Board of Directors, the two professional groups
moved to a more collaborative mode including a
softening of the boundaries between the professions.
Based on these findings, our contribution is thus
twofold. First, this study advances, our understand-
ing of the responses of large multidisciplinary PSFs
to institutional pressures (Lander, Koene and
Linssen 2013), by showing that their acquiescence to
regulation may have important implications for the
internal dynamics. Indeed, a firm’s internal dynamics
may change substantially while external responses
may stay the same. Our empirical research shows
how the introduction of the Audit Act had major
implications for the position of the different profes-
sional groups within these large accounting firms
and in particular for nonaccountants, potentially
undermining these firms’ viability. Overall, this sig-
nals the need not only to focus on external
responses, but also to account for the complex pat-
terns of boundary work from different professional
groups, as well as initiatives from the Board of
Directors channeling this boundary work in order to
understand possible internal implications.
Second, we contribute by explaining how the ini-
tial tensions between professional groups may de-
cline or even disappear through boundary work. For
example, reinstating strategies by accountants trig-
gered bending and pioneering strategies by tax advi-
sors. An important contribution from our study
relates to the dynamic nature of boundary work and
boundaries between different professional groups in
large PSFs. Various studies have identified different
boundary strategies a profession can deploy in order
to protect, maintain or change the boundary of a
profession (Bucher et al. 2016; Bos-de Vos, Lieftink
and Lauche 2019). Our work shows how these con-
cepts can be used in a more dynamic sense to further
our understanding of the interplay between different
professions. The bending and pioneering strategies
by tax advisors followed the reinstating strategy of
the accountants. This means that the time element
needs to be better accounted for: reinstating (going
back to the past, nostalgia), bending (short term, in-
cremental approach: present), and pioneering (ori-
ented to the future, more radical). Our case shows
that, in contrast to the situation in which audit
assignments were the portal to lucrative consultancy
assignments, the tax advisors accompanied the
accountants to their main clients. The fact that the
tax advisor may become the lead partner with a large
audit tender is the ultimate sign of the rehabilitation
of the tax advisor, and can be claimed as the success
of the One-Firm approach. Yet, this ‘equilibrium’ will
likely remain delicate, not least in the light of the
evolving and competing external pressures
(Greenwood et al. 2011). For example, in a next
round of rotation, it could be that the other profes-
sions will be more on their guard, weighing up their
balance and deciding whether it remains lucrative or
not to stay in the Big 4. More research is needed
from the client perspective; for instance, based on
in-depth interviews with representatives of the audit-
committees. As one such client stated in the
Tapestry Network/EY report: ‘You need to sort out
the services that conflict, and you need to plan what
you need. You need to plan the process early, the
decision-making on where we want advisory to land is
the most interesting (emphasis added)’ (Tapestry
Networks/EY, 2014: 4).
Our findings also open up many other new ave-
nues for research. One fruitful direction for further
research lies in considering the balance between the
different professions in more detail. There is a need
for future research to shed more light on whether
the strength of the internal position of the accoun-
tancy profession is temporary or not. This is in light
of the fact that one could predict that the contribu-
tion of consultancy to the overall profit of the firms
continues to increase (the Economist 2013a). Also, a
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further commodification of the audit products will
result in lower fees for accountants (Carter and
Spence 2014). More research is needed with regard
to the decision-making processes of different manag-
ing partners of the different professions. It has been
suggested that that trying to come to a consensus be-
tween partners is like ‘cat herding’ (Von
Nordenflycht 2010: 171). Furthermore, more re-
search is needed on how the concept of One-Firm is
used differently over time and in different contexts
as a solution to conflict (Niece and Trompeter 2004;
Muzio and Faulconbridge 2013).
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